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. HENOMENOLOGY IS AN INVENTORY OF CON-
sciousness as of that wherein a universe resides. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 215) 






Nathan has poor 
grammar skills 
Learns Grammar Skills 
(1) Identifies parts of speech 
correctly. 
(2) Writes correct sentences and 
uses them properly. 
(3) Writes short paragraphs in 
order to communicate more 
effectively. (Individualized 
Education Program for a 
13-year-old young man 
with learning disabilities, 
1993) 
The theoretical positions of the preceding two texts 
create significantly different orientations to the life worlds 
of people. The quote by Merleau-Ponty describes the 
essential focus of the phenomenological movement in 
philosophy—human consciousness. The Individualized Edu-
cation Program written for a 13-year-old young man with 
learning disabilities characterizes the prevalent view of 
individuals working in the field of special education—an 
orientation directed toward changing the behavior of indi-
viduals with disabilities. Whereas phenomenology privi-
leges the nature of the meanings that people construct in 
their lives and that guide their actions, special education 
focuses on the study and practice of behavioral change 
outside the context of the life meanings of individuals with 
disabilities. The shift that Bruner (1990) described in the 
early stages of the cognitive revolution from an emphasis 
on the "construction of meaning to the processing of mean-
ing" (p. 4) aptly characterizes the essential differences 
between phenomenology and special education, respec-
tively. In the construction of meaning, individuals' beliefs 
and desires are implicated, but in the processing of infor-
mation, an emphasis is placed on the computational sys-
tems of mind without reference to individuals' meanings. 
Philosophers are inquirers who are interested in 
describing the foundational concepts within some domain. 
A group of philosophers whose theoretical beginnings can 
be traced to Hegel (1910/1967) questioned the validity of 
employing the positivistic scientific model in studies of 
human beings and their world. In spite of the wide accep-
tance of this model in the natural sciences, these human 
science philosophers objected to the analogy that was 
made between the content of the natural sciences—the 
natural world of plants, animals and other non-human 
material matter—and the subject matter of the human 
world, human beings, and their cultures. 
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In response to the faulty analogy perceived by these 
human science philosophers, a movement of descriptive 
philosophy named phenomenology bloomed in the early 
twentieth century. This movement attempted to clarify a 
way of viewing human beings and their lives that identified 
the essential uniqueness of the human world. Husserl (1913/ 
1962, 1936/1965), a man trained as a mathematician, is 
regarded as the father of phenomenology. Among his phe-
nomenological followers are Schutz (1932/1967), Giorgi 
(1970), Merleau-Ponty (1942/1967), and James (1890/ 
1983). Hermeneutics, a closely related philosophical move-
ment concerned with the development of a philosophical 
theory of understanding, originated from Hegelian/ 
Marxist sources (Howard, 1982). Dilthey (1923/1988), 
Heidegger (1931/1962), Gadamar (1960/1975), and Ricoeur 
(1963/1992) are among the leading figures in that move-
ment (Howard, 1982; Polkinghorne, 1983). 
In order to develop a conceptual framework for phe-
nomenology, Husserl drew on the Kantian distinction 
between noumenon and phenomenon. Husserl argued that 
there are two kinds of reality: (1) noumenon—being in 
reality itself and (2) phenomenon—appearance of reality in 
consciousness. According to the phenomenologists, expla-
nation of the mechanisms of noumena seemed the appro-
priate subject for the natural sciences, and the description 
of phenomena should be the focus of study in the human 
sciences. 
Husserl (1913/1962, 1936/1965) argued that the posi-
tivistic paradigm was inappropriate for studying phenom-
ena because it could not describe the essential phenomena 
of the human world. Among these essential phenomena 
were values, meanings, intentions, morals, feelings, and 
the life experiences and creations of human beings. In 
order to study these phenomena, human consciousness should 
be the primary unit of analysis in the study of human life. 
The domain of phenomenology was defined as conscious-
ness, not in its materiality (i.e., the faculties associated with 
consciousness, such as neurological mechanisms), but rather 
the act of consciousness in its intentionality toward some-
thing or someone (i.e., how something or someone is expe-
rienced by me) (Polkinghorne, 1983). Husserl and his 
followers, while sometimes disagreeing on particular 
conceptualizations of consciousness, all agreed on the cen-
tral point of phenomenology. They viewed the positivistic 
scientific paradigm as flawed for studying human beings 
and their lives because it could not consider human con-
sciousness in its meaning-making capacity. 
Special education has been mostly exempt from philo-
sophic scrutiny during the field's short history, but recently 
a group of scholars both inside (e.g., Heshusius, 1982; 
Poplin, 1987; Skrtic, 1993) and outside (e.g., Coles, 1987) 
the field of special education have begun to examine the 
knowledge base in special education. These philosophi-
cally oriented scholars have argued that the foundational 
knowledge in special education is rooted in the positivistic 
tradition of the natural sciences. While there has been 
some counter-argument suggesting that the roots of spe-
cial education emerged from nonpositivistic theoretical 
bases such as psychodynamic approaches (Ulman & 
Rosenberg, 1986), the prevalent critical, philosophic view 
regards special education as emerging from a natural science 
worldview. 
Like the phenomenologists, the philosophic critics of 
special education argue that the positivistic scientific view 
that has been incorporated into special education theory 
and practice is not appropriate for advancing the field 
today. The explicit reduction of human life to attributes of 
the natural world has created a view of the individual with 
disabilities that is mechanistic and psychological in the 
narrow sense, rather than holistic and psychological in 
the broad sense of being culturally sensitive. As a result 
of the adoption of the positivistic model, these critics 
argue, the desires and beliefs that shape the activities of 
individuals with disabilities in specific cultural contexts are 
not well understood. Recent work, however, has begun to 
redress this problem via the adoption of a sociocultural 
orientation to the study of learning handicaps (e.g., Cousin, 
Aragon, & Rojas, 1993; Klenk, 1993; Palincsar & Klenk, 
1992; Stone & Reid, 1993; Stone & Wertsch, 1984) and a 
phenomenological hybrid perspective (McPhail, 1993). 
Before launching into an elaboration of the philoso-
phy and methods of phenomenology, I will discuss briefly 
some of the central tenets of positivism. Because the posi-
tivist science movement spawned phenomenology and now 
is seen by many in special education as the conceptual 
basis of the field, it is important to position a discussion of 
phenomenology and special education within the root para-
digm. A description of the assumptions of the positivist 
science frame of reference will clarify and highlight the 
similarities to and differences from the phenomenological 
philosophical view. 
The worldview inherent in positivism that appeared to 
capture the imagination of Renaissance scientists like Galileo 
and Newton was that the discoverable, regular patterns of 
natural phenomena could be explained in mathematical/ 
logical formulas. This view created the possibility of human 
beings establishing a world through their scientific investi-
gations that was not ruled by superstition, chance, and 
local knowledge, but rather, by a universal system of knowl-
edge based on rationality containing unprecedented oppor-
tunities for prediction and control. 
When this way of seeing the world was extended to 
the study of human beings through the writings of Hobbes, 
Comte, and Mill, the phenomena associated with being 
human, such as thinking and behaving, were also assumed 
to function with the regularities of natural phenomena 
(Polkinghorne, 1983). This view necessarily regarded internal 
experiences, such as sensation, perception, and the emo-
tions, as well as the external behaviors of human beings 
and the nonhuman material, natural world as material 
things that could be studied and analyzed in order to 
unlock the regular patterns. In this worldview, the most 
noble task of human scientists was to discover the regulari-
ties in human behavior, and then represent them in a 
logical model or system. This logical system could then be 
used to influence the motion of the natural world and the 
behavior of human beings to improve the conditions of 
life. 
It is not surprising that early special education schol-
ars embraced this worldview, a worldview that seems to 
hold so much promise for individuals with disabilities. In 
fact, it can be reasonably argued that the application of the 
positivist science model to the study of disabling condi-
tions has been beneficial in permitting us to develop effec-
tive interventions such as drug therapy for individuals 
suffering from depression. Additionally, the positivist para-
digm has shed light on some of the neurological correlates 
to learning disabilities that would otherwise have remained 
undisclosed (Flowers, 1993; Galaburda, 1990). However, 
these discoveries must be placed in the context of the 
human natural tendency toward meaning making. Damasio 
(1994), a neurologist, summed up the limitations of the 
positivist science approach to the understanding of mind 
as follows: 
First, as I previously indicated, only a part of 
the circuitry in our brains is specified by genes. 
The human genome specifies the construction 
of our bodies in great detail, and that includes 
the overall design of the brain. But not all of the 
circuits actively develop and work as set by 
genes. Much of the brain's circuitry, at any 
given moment of adult life, is individual and 
unique, truly reflective of that particular 
organism's history and circumstances. . . . 
Second, each human organism operates in 
collectives of like beings; the mind and the 
behavior of individuals belonging to such 
collectives and operating in specific cultural and 
physical environments are not shaped merely by 
the activity-driven circuitries mentioned above, 
and even less shaped by genes alone. To 
understand in a satisfactory manner the brain 
that fabricates human mind and human behav-
ior, it is necessary to take into account its social 
and cultural context, (p. 260) 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT HUMAN BEINGS 
AND CULTURE 
The first of the three requirements of a scholastic tradi-
tion, according to Jacob (1987), is that a group of scholars 
must share the same worldview regarding the domain of 
their study. Although differences do exist among phe-
nomenologists (e.g., in specific ways of conceptualizing 
consciousness), in the following section I highlight 
the shared core assumptions that have undergirded the 
movement. 
Consciousness 
For phenomenologists, perhaps the single most important 
assumption about human beings is that consciousness is the 
sine qua non of human life. Among the various contents of 
consciousness are imagination, remembrance, perception, 
and logical forms. The importance of these aspects of 
consciousness is not in the natural science atemporal 
conceptualization of them as separate faculties, but instead 
in the part they play in bringing signification to experi-
ences. Husserl (1936/1965) wanted to develop a "phe-
nomenology of consciousness as opposed to a natural science 
about consciousness" (p. 91). He was interested in under-
standing things as they appear in individual consciousness. 
Elimination of Dualisms 
The second important assumption of phenomenology is 
the belief that in consciousness, or the meaning making 
source of living, experiences are constituted holistically— 
there is no substantial difference between the subjective 
and objective world. This is because consciousness is always 
constituted in a reality that is not isolated from the experi-
ential world. This assumption clearly breaks with the empir-
ical tradition of dividing the world into material and 
nonmaterial, or the objective and subjective realms. Husserl 
wrote: "To the extent, however, that every consciousness 
is consciousness-of,' the essential study of conscious-
ness includes also that of consciousness-meaning and 
consciousness-objectivity as such" (1965, p. 90). 
Hegel, who is often considered a forerunner of phe-
nomenology, described the essential connectedness of the 
subjective and objective in consciousness: "What at first 
appeared as object is reduced, when it passes into con-
sciousness, to what knowledge takes it to be, and the 
implicit nature, the real in itself, becomes what this entity 
per se is for consciousness . . ." (1910/1967, p. 144). 
Phenomenology has sometimes been viewed as being 
merely a subjective philosophy, but this is an erroneous 
interpretation. According to phenomenology, every act of 
consciousness contains the objective/subjective aspects of 
the same thing. In fact, phenomenology views the study of 
consciousness as the only access to the realities of the 
experiential world of human beings. 
Consciousness Is Temporal 
Another important assumption of phenomenology is that 
consciousness has a temporal aspect to it; each individual 
consciousness carries the lived experiences of the past 
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within it as well as anticipations of the future. Essentially, 
there is no stopping point to consciousness in that along 
with its historicity and futuricity, it is always being recon-
stituted in new experiences. James (1890/1983) described 
this phenomenon well: "Every definite image in the mind is 
steeped and dyed in the free water that flows around it. 
With it goes the sense of its relations, near and remote, the 
dying echo of whence it came to us, the dawning sense of 
whither it is to lead" (p. 246). 
Whereas Husserl paid scant attention to the historical 
quality of consciousness, Heidegger (1931/1962) consti-
tuted his hermeneutics with an acute sense of the influ-
ence of time. He viewed human life as "thrown" into a way 
of being and giving meaning. A part of this assumption is 
the notion that experiences are lived before they are under-
stood. Thus, it is in the "flow of life" that meanings are 
lived and only later brought to consciousness. This assump-
tion naturally creates a tension with the positivist science 
goal of explaining structures of consciousness that are 
timeless and universal. 
The Cultural World Is a Creation 
of Human Meanings 
The last assumption to be addressed arises from the previ-
ous ones. The cultural world is a creation of the meanings 
human beings possess in consciousness. This assumption 
has two parts: (a) The cultural world is created through the 
meaningful connections each individual experiences in her 
or his contexts, and (b) cultural institutions are the cre-
ations that have emerged out of life activities. Thus 
phenomenological-hermeneutical study necessarily involves 
a study of the cultural systems in which individuals live. 
Culture is not something constructed outside of con-
sciousness or the constitutions of meaning, but rather, is 
co-constructed in lived experiences both on the individual 
level and the group level. Whereas Mill (1953) viewed 
society and its laws as the response to humans registering 
sensation in a passive way, the phenomenologists saw cul-
ture as the result of the active meaning-making systems of 
individuals as they engaged in their daily lives. 
Concerning human sciences, however, it has 
become clear to us that psychic and psycho-
physical facts constitute the foundation of a 
theory not only of individuals but likewise of 
systems of culture as well as external organiza-
tion of society and that these facts underlie 
historical intuition and analysis in every one of 
their stages. (Dilthey, 1923/1988, p. 147) 
Thus, the study of human consciousness is both the study 
of subjectivity and the objective cultural circumstances as 
constituted in experience of them. 
F o c i OF PHENOMENOLOGY 
Phenomenology's foci emerge from its central assump-
tions. First, it is "lived experience" as constituted in con-
sciousness that is the unit of analysis for uncovering the 
structures of experience. Lived experience is a holistic 
phenomenon in consciousness that contains the multiple 
constituents of consciousness, such as numerous cogni-
tive and affective dimensions. Because there is no way of 
attaining a stance outside of experience to attain under-
standing of human life, all attempts to penetrate the mean-
ings of human life must be situated within the flow of 
natural life experiences. Thus, phenomenologists do not 
construct inauthentic, laboratory situations for the study 
of the structures of life, but rather, situate their investiga-
tions of consciousness within the everyday world. It is in 
the everyday world that human beings constitute the mean-
ings that guide their actions. 
Second, since phenomenologists are interested in 
individuals as meaning makers, they study meaningful 
action rather than behavior. Within this distinction, action 
is viewed as being guided by values and motivations, whereas 
behavior is not. According to Schutz (1967), "action is 
(1) a lived experience that is (2) guided by a plan or proj-
ect arising from the subject's spontaneous activity and 
(3) distinguished from all other lived experiences by a 
peculiar Act of attention" (p. 215). Thus, phenomenologists 
would not observe behavior in isolation (e.g., response 
time and memory), that is, separated from the contexts in 
which these are meaningfully employed in action patterns. 
Finally, phenomenologists are interested in the vari-
ous structures of consciousness that lend meaning in life. 
Thus, they do not privilege formal reasoning in their study, 
but instead focus on all the structures of relationships that 
may emerge in individual consciousness that shape mean-
ing. Among the patterns that emerge may be relationships 
of self and world, means and ends, and power. As a result, 
phenomenology often investigates what psychologists refer 
to as practical reasoning or folk psychology (see Bruner, 
1990). Imagination, affect, and remembrances are some of 
the other structures of consciousness that are focused on 
by phenomenologists in the process of coming to under-
stand the meanings of human life and the constructions 
that develop from those meanings. 
METHODOLOGY 
Unlike the prescribed methodology of the positivist sci-
ences, phenomenology does not follow prescribed rules. 
Rather, it has a set of guiding principles that researchers 
must keep in mind as they proceed. In order to explicate 
these principles fully, I will contrast the context of doing 
positivist science with that of phenomenology. 
Positivist science is oriented toward knowledge acqui-
sition or episteme. Polkinghorne (1983) described three 
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basic canons of positivist science designed to meet the 
goal of episteme: 
1. Knowledge is not opinion or doxa. Knowl-
edge is represented in statements of direct 
observation, or is derived from statements 
that have been deductively linked to direct 
observation. Inductive statements are less 
valid than deductive ones because they only 
represent approximations of episteme. 
2. Knowledge is achieved when statements 
can be deductively generated and linked 
from axiomatic statements, and empirically 
verified. 
3. Statements of opinion are inadmissable in 
scientific research because they are not 
grounded in observation and an axiomatic 
system. 
When this model is applied to the study of human 
beings, doxa is necessarily omitted from analysis. Thus, 
human beings must be studied in the ways that are subject 
to verification through observation. Mere opinion and other 
aspects of subjectivity cannot be included as evidence that 
will stand up to logical analysis. 
The philosophical context in which phenomenological 
research is situated contrasts sharply to that of positivist 
science. Phenomenology is not interested in episteme or 
verifiable knowledge, but has as its goal the uncovering of 
doxa or the belief patterns of human beings that provide 
their meaning, guide their actions, and have been con-
structed in the act of living. Human beings in their numer-
ous meaning-making processes are the subject matter of 
phenomenological research. The goal of this type of research 
is not to arrive at explanation, but rather to come to understand 
the processes that human beings engage in as they construct 
meaning from experiences. Phenomenological methods are 
judged by their usefulness in improving our understanding 
of human meaning making within a particular area of 
inquiry, not by their ability to lead to new discoveries or to 
verify laws. 
One of the difficulties of phenomenology is that the 
researcher is engaging in the description of meanings 
that always stand in relationships that are ever-changing. 
The phenomenologists recognized this dilemma and 
responded to it in different ways. Husserl, for example, 
believed that through the collection of carefully selected 
individual cases in which the structures of consciousness 
become revealed, a systematic knowing of the ways 
human beings construct meaning could be elaborated. 
Dilthey (1923/1988) submitted that through descriptive/ 
interpretive research one could not arrive at objective 
knowledge, but that one could move closer to approxima-
tions of truth. Heidegger (1931/1962) believed that the 
process of doing descriptive/interpretive research is a cir-
cular process of understanding that is itself constitutive of 
meaning. Researchers necessarily approach their project 
with the preconceived notions that are a part of their 
being. As researchers proceed, however, they can work 
toward revealing their own preconceptions, thus illuminat-
ing opportunities for change or growth. Thus, interpreta-
tion is necessarily involved in understanding, and the 
hermeneutic circular process describes the movements that 
are critical to that understanding. However, the results of 
this process do not produce verifiable knowledge, but instead 
understandings that can be judged by their effectiveness in 
addressing the concerns of the inquiry (Packer & Addison, 
1989). 
Within this context, human beings and their numer-
ous ways of making meaning have a privileged status. This 
status is related to one of the guiding principles of phe-
nomenological research: The goal of research is to create 
an openness regarding the possibilities for human beings 
to uncover their own categories or organizing themes. In 
other words, phenomenological research asks the researcher 
to respect the unique meaning-making structures of the 
individuals with whom they are engaged, rather than impos-
ing a priori categories. Barritt, Beekman, Bleeker, and 
Mulderij (1983) suggested that one of the goals of phe-
nomenological research is to effectively communicate "the 
other's" way of seeing things. 
So, instead of offering a prescriptive set of techniques 
for doing phenomenology, phenomenology and interpre-
tive research call researchers to study human life in ways 
that will create understandings about the processes indi-
viduals engage in as they construct meanings. This kind of 
call challenges researchers to construct methods of investi-
gation that are appropriate to advancing our understand-
ings of human life in an area of inquiry. Thus, whether it is 
personal consciousness, cultural practices, or artifacts under 
study, researchers must ground their undertakings in the 
view that human life is constructed in meaningful experi-
ences. The action of describing the patterns involved in 
human life experiences, as well as penetrating their mean-
ings through interpretation, is the art and the purpose of 
phenomenological/hermeneutic research. 
APPLICATIONS TO W A Y S OF DOING 
SPECIAL EDUCATION 
The theory and practice of phenomenology as such has not 
made an inroad into special education research and prac-
tice. Yet, through recent attempts to ground special educa-
tion research and practice in sociocultural theory, many of 
the ideas central to phenomenology are being employed 
(e.g., Cousin et al., 1993; Klenk, 1993; Palincsar & Klenk, 
1992; Rueda & Mehan, 1986; Stone & Reid, 1993; Stone 
& Wertsch, 1984). In an article devoted to elaborating 
Vygotsky's sociocultural theory through explication of his 
earliest writings on the psychology of art and the psycho-
logical development of individuals with disabilities, Minick's 
(1989) characterization of many of the conceptual under-
pinnings of Vygotsky's theory are remarkably similar to 
those in phenomenology. Minick described Vygotsky's 
conceptualization of psychology in the following way: "Psy-
chology, Vygotsky argues here, is a social science because 
everything within us is social, yet it is a science not of cultural 
or ideological form but of the psyche of the single individual" 
(1989, p. 7). Minick continued, "The child's consciousness 
and development, Vygotsky argued here, is defined not by 
the social world as such but by the child's relationship to 
that world" (p. 19). Finally, Minick stated, "Vygotsky 
defined experience as a unit of analysis, arguing that it 
represents the link between the whole personality and the 
social situation in the same sense that word meaning repre-
sents the link between cognition and speech in social 
interaction" (p. 25). 
Without carefully analyzing the similarities and differ-
ences in these two theoretical frames of reference, a task 
beyond the limits of this article, it is clear that the sociocul-
tural perspective addresses many of the same concerns as 
phenomenology relative to the study of human beings and 
their culture. The meaning-making processes of conscious-
ness or mind while engaged in practical activities became 
the cornerstone of Vygotsky's sociocultural theory of devel-
opment. 
Consequently, phenomenological tenets are being used 
in many interesting and innovative research projects in 
special education under the rubric of sociocultural theory. 
Time does not permit me to do justice to all of the work 
that is being done in special education in sociocultural 
theory or phenomenological hybrids, but I will address two 
studies for the purpose of describing the kinds of under-
standings that can occur with this kind of research. 
Cousin, Aragon, and Rojas (1993) recently completed 
a study of the literacy development of an adolescent male 
with learning disabilities over the course of a year. They 
were interested in coming to understand how he practiced 
and understood literacy under the condition of engage-
ment in various kinds of literacy activities. Thus, through 
observation in the classroom, interviews, and examination 
of various artifacts, such as work samples, certain patterns 
emerged that suggested his constructions of meanings 
relative to literacy. Analyses indicated that the quality of 
this young man's literacy improved when he was engaged 
in activities that were more natural, such as writing a letter 
to one of the researchers about a novel he had read, rather 
than school-like, such as writing about the same novel but 
as part of a journal assignment in school. Also, in inter-
views and letters in which this young man described his 
perspectives on himself and literacy, it became apparent 
that he was conscious of his individual strengths and weak-
nesses in literacy and development in general, and of how 
these attributes played themselves out in varying real world 
contexts. 
This study advanced our understandings of the mean-
ings this young man with learning disabilities carried rela-
tive to his relationships of self and the everyday world of 
literacy and learning. Developing a beginning understand-
ing of these relationships increases our abilities to see how 
the activities this young man engages in are guided by the 
meanings he has constructed, and is constructing, in real 
world activities. We have a glimpse into the ways he has 
constituted social meanings, a goal of both phenomenol-
ogy and social constructivism. 
The second study (McPhail, 1993) is a phenomeno-
logical-hybrid endeavor, so called because the methodol-
ogy used, although primarily cast from phenomenological 
principles, utilizes principles from measurement research 
practices and ecological research—the Experience Sam-
pling Methodology developed by Prescott, Csikszentmihalyi, 
and Graef (1976). In this study, daily experiences of three 
groups of adolescents over the course of a week were 
studied. The goal of this undertaking was to increase our 
understanding of the ways average-achieving adolescents, 
low-achieving adolescents, and adolescents with learning 
disabilities were experiencing their life situations. Through 
sampling experiences, both during and after school, pat-
terns of thinking, affect, motivation, and self-esteem 
emerged. These patterns reflected the meanings these ado-
lescents had constructed and were constructing relative to 
their daily activities. 
Analyses from this study suggested several counter-
intuitive findings. Contrary to the prevalent belief in the 
deleterious effects of labeling, particularly for older stu-
dents, this study indicated that adolescents with learning 
disabilities experienced their school situations more posi-
tively than both of the other groups of adolescents. Addi-
tional analyses (McPhail & Muhlberger, in preparation) 
suggested that within the group of adolescents with learn-
ing disabilities, specific kinds of school contexts had dif-
ferent impacts on these adolescents. Specifically, the 
students with LD experienced the resource room more 
positively than other contexts, such as self-contained con-
tent classrooms. 
It could be argued that one of the strengths of this 
kind of phenomenological study is that "the other"—in this 
case, adolescents with learning disabilities—is provided 
the opportunity to reveal his or her ways of viewing the 
world. This kind of understanding then creates the oppor-
tunity for those of us not engaged in the practices of being 
an adolescent with learning disabilities to come to see the 
ways meanings can be constructed in specific contexts, 
contexts that are otherwise outside of our experiences. 
Also, because various constituents of consciousness are 
involved in the experience samplings, such as components 
of affect, thinking, cognition, motivation, and self-esteem, 
more holistic pictures of daily experiences emerge. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Coming to understand and appreciate alternative 
approaches to doing research can benefit the field of spe-
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cial education. Questions and issues that we have not been 
able to address before can be studied with new methodolo-
gies. Although some might be concerned that the loss of 
hegemony of the logical-positivist paradigm in special edu-
cation research and practice will create anarchy and poten-
tially retard the development of our field, this outcome is 
not inevitable. Instead, loosening the logical-positivist 
stronghold in special education research and practice can 
advance our knowledge of the phenomenon called special 
education through increasing our understandings. As our 
understandings of other ways of studying human beings 
increase, we can create a community of special education 
scholars, including those in the logical-positivist tradition, 
that slowly circumambulates the phenomenon of special 
education for the purpose of identifying critical issues and 
problems. We might ask important questions, such as, 
What is the purpose of special education? Then, through 
discourse with members of our community, we can craft 
inquiries that are grounded in methods appropriate for 
addressing our concerns. 
Descriptive-interpretive inquiry has two very impor-
tant contributions to bring to the methodological discourse 
table. First, phenomenology suggests that the narrow psy-
chological frames of reference we have traditionally used 
in research and practice in special education do not cap-
ture the sociocultural contexts that are an integral part of 
the psychological development of individuals with learning 
differences. Vygotsky (1993) understood that the study of 
the ways social relations are reorganized for individuals 
with disabilities was the proper area of inquiry, rather than 
the nature of the disabling condition in and of itself. 
Although Curtis (1978) conceived of the purpose of edu-
cation, in general, as attempting to assist the child to 
"make sense of things for himself (p. xx), this orientation 
could also be applied to individuals with disabilities. Phe-
nomenology could permit us to explore these important 
domains, and as a consequence advance our understand-
ings of the ways individuals with disabilities create and use 
meanings in their lives. 
Second, the interpretive tradition challenges us as 
special education researchers to make our own conscious-
ness an area of inquiry. Our "fore-structures," as Heidegger 
suggested, undoubtedly influence our research and prac-
tices. Entering into the hermeneutic circle of inquiry by 
making of ourselves a study, as well as those we are engaged 
with, could infuse a freshness and honesty to the field of 
special education. • 
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